Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach by Priest, George L.
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Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code gives a buyer the
right to rescission or damages when goods tendered by the seller do
not conform to the contract of sale. In this Article, Professor Priest
discusses the origins and text of the Code's nonconforming tender
provisions and analyzes the likely effect of the Code's choices of
remedy on the economic efficiency of sales. He then examines case
law under the Code and concludes that courts, often despite the let-
ter of the statute, have interpreted and applied the nonconforming
tender provisions in a manner consistent with minimization of costs.
T HIS Article considers the manner in which courts have in-
terpreted and applied the provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code 1 giving a buyer the right to rescind a contract of
sale when the goods tendered by -the seller deviate from their
description in the contract. It shows that, in general, courts
regularly have applied a wide variety of statutory provisions in a
way which is likely to enhance the efficiency of sales. Economic
efficiency never has been recognized explicitly as a standard of
Code interpretation and is seldom mentioned as a criterion of
decision in judicial opinions. But the results of decisions in-
terpreting the Code are consistent with minimization of long-
run costs of formation of the contract, of delivery and handling
of the goods, and of resolution of disputes arising under ,the con-
tract.
Part I analyzes the problem of nonconforming tenders from
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for helpful comments on a previous draft. David McCourt, Martha Ratnoff, and
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'The provisions treated in detail in this Article are the following: U.C.C. §
2-508 (seller's right to cure), see pp. 971-74, 98o-8i, 999-iooo infra; U.C.C. §
2-6o (perfect tender rule for rejection), see pp. 969-72, 975-76 infra; U.C.C. § 2-
602 (manner of rejection), see pp. 973-77, 983-91, 995-99 infra; U.C.C. § 2-608
(revocation of acceptance), see pp. 972-75, 977-80, 992-99 infra; U.C.C. § 2-612
(installment contracts), see notes 42 & 124 infra. Other provisions are cited
incidentally where relevant.
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an economic perspective and explores the circumstances in which
refusal of the goods by the buyer is a more efficient remedy than
damages. Part II describes the origins of the Code's nonconform-
ing tender provisions as a compromise between the common law's
rigid insistence on perfect tenders and the proposals of Karl
Llewellyn that sales law be made responsive to modern commer-
cial relationships - proposals consistent in some, but not all,
respects with minimization of the costs of breach. Part III shows
in detail the various inconsistencies between the letter of the
Code and the objective of efficiency. Finally, Part IV reports the
results of a study of all reported trial and appellate decisions
between 1954 and 1976 in which the buyer attempted to return
the goods because they failed to conform to the contract. It shows
that those decisions are consistent with minimization of costs as
far as one can tell from the facts reported in the opinions. The
Article thus concludes that courts have been strongly influenced
by the advantages of minimizing costs in their interpretation and
application of the legal doctrines of the Code.
The present Article differs from previous studies of the Uni-
form Commercial Code 2 in its emphasis on the divergence between
the formal articulation of the rules and their application in prac-
tice. The provisions of the Code were drafted to control a diverse
set of sales transactions. Most provisions are general rather than
specific and require judicial interpretation in any individual case.
As a result, no study of the effect of the Code can be complete
without an examination of judicial interpretation. It is the
application of the provisions in practice -an application which
often ignores their letter - that determines their effect.
I. MINIMIZING THE COSTS IMPOSED BY
NONCONFORMING TENDERS
In the absence of legal restraints, the terms of a sale are set
by voluntary agreement between the parties. It is plausible to
assume that a buyer and seller generally will agree to terms which
maximize the joint value of the exchange. Legal rules establishing
rights and remedies for contracting parties affect the costs of con-
sensual transactions in two respects. First, they affect the costs
of reaching a bargain. To the extent that the legal rules anticipate
2 See, e.g., Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating ta the Sale of
Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article 2, 73 YALE
L.J. gg (1963).
Professor Schwartz has discussed the costs imposed by the cure and revoca-
tion provisions of article 2, Schwartz, Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects:
The Utility of Bargains, 16 B.C. INDus. & Cox. L. REV. 543 ('975), but his ap-
proach was normative and he did not review case law comprehensively.
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the specific allocation of rights that the parties would have chosen
themselves, they reduce the cost of forming a contract.3 If
legal rules require different terms, however, the parties may
want to "contract out" of the rules, thereby increasing the costs
of contract formation. If the legal rules preclude contrary agree-
ment, the parties may adjust other contractual terms to compen-
sate for their inability to minimize costs. Such adjustments, of
course, require negotiation and consequently raise the costs of
forming a contract. Second, legal rules influence the costs of
settlement of disputes arising after the contract is made.4 While
a buyer and seller presumably will want to resolve a contract
dispute in a way that minimizes joint costs, remedies provided
by law will affect the costs of negotiating a resolution. Again, if
courts resolve a dispute in the way that the parties would have
resolved it had they provided for it explicitly in the contract, the
costs of negotiating a resolution to the dispute will be minimized.
If not, or if the legal resolution of the dispute is uncertain, the
costs of negotiating a settlement will be increased.
Analysis of the effects of the Code on the costs of sales trans-
actions requires comparison of the rights and remedies to which
a buyer and seller are likely to agree with those provided by law.
Section A considers the parties' definition of "conformity to the
contract:" their agreement on the characteristics of the goods that
the seller is to tender. Section B considers the conditions under
which the parties will agree to the remedy of rescission and the
buyer's return of goods to the seller, rather than damages, given
a failure of the tender to conform.5
A. What Constitutes a Nonconforming Tender?
Every sales contract must in some way specify the "tender"
agreed upon. It must describe some of the infinite number of
identifying attributes of the goods as well as the manner of their
delivery. As the number of attributes of the tender described in
the contract increases, the cost of negotiating a contract rises.
The parties will specify the various characteristics of the tender
I Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, i 3. LEGAL
STUD. 277, 293 (1972). See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. i (I96O).
4 See generally Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 419 (973).
'Throughout this Article, the terms "efficiency" and "cost minimization" are
used interchangeably. Efficiency requires the optimum allocation of resources, i.e.,
the maximization of value net of costs, not only as between the parties, but as
to the rest of the world as well. In the case of contract law, it may be assumed
that transaction costs are small enough not to affect which goods are exchanged,
so that the transaction costs themselves are the only important determinants of net
value. Thus efficiency and minimization of these costs coincide.
Vol. 9i:96o
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only as long as the costs of specification are less than the expected
benefits. To the extent that the parties neglect specification in the
contract, they leave to courts the task of deducing the attributes
upon which they "agreed." A court responding to a concern for
efficiency can infer those charcteristics by assuming that the
parties would have negotiated the absent term to achieve the
greatest mutual gain. This assumption implies that a particular
attribute would be required by a contract only when its provision
would cost the seller less than it would benefit the buyer.
B. When is it Efficient to Rescind a Contract
Because of a Nonconforming Tender?
Once the contract is found to have been breached by a non-
conforming tender, the law provides the buyer two possible
remedies. He may call off the sale and return the goods to the
seller,' or he may keep the goods and seek damages for the non-
conformity.' The costs imposed by these two remedies can be
classified into two categories. First, there are allocative costs -
the transfer of real resources from one or both of the parties to the
outside world. Freight and insurance for reshipment, administra-
tive costs of resale, and fees for attorneys involved in dispute
resolution fall into this category. Second are distributive costs,
which consist of transfers of resources between the parties, as
when one party recovers damages from the other. Ordinarily,
the minimization of allocative costs will benefit the parties regard-
less of the distribution of costs between them. However, the
distribution of costs will affect allocative costs because each party
will strive to minimize his personal share of the joint costs, even
if his effort increases joint costs. In fact, in any dispute over the
interpretation of a contract, the parties will expend resources in
negotiation or litigation, thereby reducing the joint value of the
transaction. In the text that follows, the conditions for minimiz-
ing the allocative costs of a remedy are first analyzed apart from
the effects of the distribution of costs. Then the causes and effects
of the distribution of costs between the parties are analyzed
separately.
i. Minimizing Allocative Costs of the Remedy. -A judg-
ment awarding damages differs from a judgment returning the
goods to the seller in two ways. First, to award damages, the
' See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-6oi, -602, -6o8. The remedy of rescission existed in the
previous uniform statute, see UIrORM SALES ACT §§ II, 44(3), 69(i) (i9o6 ver-
sion), and at common law, see 2 F. MECHEm, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALE
OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 817, 818, 1210 (IgOI).
'See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-711 to -715. Cf. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69(7) (i9o6
version) (predecessor to U.C.C.); 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 6, § 1210 (common
law).
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buyer's loss from the defect must be calculated. Second, if the
buyer recovers damages, he keeps the defective goods and must
either adapt them for his use or dispose of them, while if the buyer
returns the goods to the seller, the seller must dispose of them.
Thus, the principal allocative costs of the damage remedy are
the buyer's costs of adaptation, or his costs of disposal and cover, 8
and the administrative cost of determining the buyer's loss. If
the buyer adapts the goods, the costs are the expenditures the
buyer must make to bring the goods into conformity with the con-
tract or the adjustments he must make to use the nonconforming
goods.' If he resells the defective goods and covers by buying
other goods - which will be the more efficient course of action if
his costs of adaptation are greater than those of other firms in the
market -the costs of breach are the difference between the re-
sale and cover prices, plus the administrative costs to the buyer
of effectuating the resale and procuring replacement goods. A
damage remedy entails the calculation of these costs - a process
which requires the expenditure of resources whether performed
by a court or by the parties themselves in settlement negotiations.
In addition, the calculation introduces a risk of error to the buyer
and seller, respectively, of underestimating or overestimating the
buyer's loss, which increases the cost of the damage remedy.
When the buyer is allowed to refuse the defective tender,
different costs are incurred. They include the cost of returning the
goods to the seller, the cost to the seller of reselling the defective
goods, and the buyer's costs of purchasing substitute goods, i.e.,
the difference between the cover and contract prices plus the ad-
ministrative costs of effectuating the purchase. If the buyer and
seller negotiate toward the efficient remedy, they would likely
agree to rescission where the sum of the costs of returning the
goods is less than the total cost of the cheaper of the damage
remedies.1°
' The Code allows the buyer to recover these costs if he can prove the non-
conformity, see U.C.C. §§ 2-711(1) (a), -712.
' The buyer's costs of adjustment include purely subjective costs, equal to the
amount of compensation a consumer would demand to accommodate himself to a
defect without repair or modification.
While legal rules often do not recognize such costs because they are difficult
to prove, efficiency requires that the buyer's subjective loss be used as the meas-
ure of damages where it is less than the contract-market differential normally so
used, see, e.g., id. § 2-713.
'°Professor Schwartz's analysis of costs is similar to that offered here, see
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 547-51 & n.15, but he assumes implicitly that the
buyer's costs of adaptation of defective or repaired goods will ordinarily be high
relative to the costs of reselling rejected goods. This assumption leads him to
criticize the Code's provisions for cure and revocation of acceptance. Id. at 551,
568-69.
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Although the comparison of the costs of rescission and dam-
ages appears complicated, it can be simplified. Parties wishing to
maximize the joint value of the transaction will prefer return of
the goods to damages whenever the goods have a greater value in
the seller's hands than in the buyer's. The value of the goods in
the seller's hands is their market value less the seller's costs of
retrieval and resale. The value of the goods in the buyer's hands
is the greater of (i) their market value less the buyer's costs of
resale, or (2) their value to the buyer after adaptation less the
costs of adapting them. If the parties seek to conserve costs, they
might first compare the value of the defective goods to the buyer
with the market value of the goods. Where the loss from the
defect is less to the buyer than to the market, returning the goods
is generally not the cheaper remedy. If, however, the value to
the buyer of the defective goods is less than the market value, the
parties would agree to return the goods to the seller if the seller's
costs of resale were lower than the buyer's by an amount greater
than the retrieval costs. If the buyer's business involves the sale
of defective as well as conforming goods, the buyer's and the
seller's costs of resale may be equivalent, so that retrieval costs
tip the balance in favor of a damage remedy. However, if the
buyer is a consumer or is engaged solely in manufacturing, the
value of managerial time necessary to resell the defective goods
may be substantial. Then the advantages of the original seller -
superior information about potential customers for defective goods
and a superior distribution system - may offset the costs of re-
trieval and make rescission the preferable remedy.
In many cases, the cost of calculating damages may be decisive
in determining which is the more efficient remedy, especially where
there is no market in goods possessing the particular defect. Since
in such cases the buyer's subjective valuation is difficult to ascer-
tain, there is great danger both of the buyer's self-serving testi-
mony and of a failure adequately to appreciate the particular
tastes of the buyer. Where the latter factor is dominant, the
remedy of returning the goods to the seller is the analogue of
the equitable remedy of specific performance, which is awarded
in sales of land or other "unique" forms of property because the
legal remedy of damages is viewed as "inadequate." "
2. Effects of the Distribution of Costs Between the Parties.-
This Article assumes, to the contrary, that the handling and managerial costs
involved in retrieval and resale will ordinarily dominate. The consequences of
this assumption are elaborated in Part III infra and are compared with the results
of judicial decisions in Part IV infra.
11 See, e.g., J. PomxERoy, A TREATiSE oN THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CON-
TRACTS § 4, at S-6 (3d ed. 1926); cf. U.C.C. § 2-716 (specific performance of a
sale where "the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances").
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The analysis thus far has ignored the distribution of the joint
costs of breach between the buyer and seller. Because the choice
of remedy can affect that distribution, each party may, for selfish
reasons, prefer the remedy which, under the analysis so far, is
less efficient. Moreover, each party may incur further allocative
costs in negotiating or litigating toward the remedy which pro-
vides him the greatest personal benefit. Thus, the effects of the
distribution of costs may affect not only the choice of remedy, but
also the joint cost of the remedy chosen.
The remedy of rescission is designed to place the parties in
their precontractual position: the goods are returned to the seller
and the contract price is returned to the buyer. Damages, on the
other hand, are designed to put the buyer in the position in which
he would have been had the contract been performed. The meas-
ure of damages is the difference between the value of the goods
as described in the contract and the value of the defective goods
as tendered - with both values determined as of the time of
tender. 2 Consequently, where the value of the goods has declined
between agreement and tender, the buyer, by refusing the goods,
can gain the difference between the lower market price at tender
and the contract price. A rescinding buyer therefore receives
more than he would have received had the contract been per-
formed. or - what is the same thing - had he been awarded dam-
ages.
The same analysis applies where the buyer has bought un-
wisely, either because he has miscalculated the value of the goods
in his own business or a secondary market, or because he has
bought without complete knowledge of the suitability of the
goods for their intended use. Upon the buyer's receipt of the
information showing the goods to be unsuitable, the value of the
goods to him declines. If the buyer rescinds the contract, the
seller must bear the costs of retrieving the goods and reselling
them in addition to the cost of any depreciation of the goods while
they were in the buyer's possession. The buyer, on the other hand,
recovers the full contract price, with which he can purchase more
suitable goods.
Costs of retrieval, resale, and administration are not the only
costs which must be distributed between the parties. There is
also the cost of uncertainty, or risk. Risks in a sale include the
possibility of a change in the market price of the goods after
agreement and the possibility of a change in the buyer's circum-
stances. Ordinarily, a contract which specifies the price of goods
2 This was the measure of damages under the common law and the Uniform
Sales Act. See sources cited note 7 supra. The Code, however, permits other
reasonable measures of damages in special circumstances. See U.C.C. § 2-714.
[Vol. 9i :960
HeinOnline -- 91 Harv. L. Rev.  966 1977-1978
NONCONFORMING TENDERS
can be assumed to place the risk of a decline in market price on
the buyer."3 Similarly, a sales contract, absent warranties, places
the risk of the inappropriateness of product choice on the buyer,
who has superior information about the prospective use. Whether
explicit or implicit, a contractual allocation of risk between the
parties is like any other term of the contract: if legal rules counter-
mand the term preferred by the parties, the costs of negotiation
and settlement will rise. Thus, if the legal rules allow the buyer
to shift the risk of market decline or inappropriate choice of prod-
uct onto the seller, the joint value of the contract - and of
future contracts of the same type - will be reduced.
Where the price of the goods declines after formation of the
contract, the buyer has an incentive to conjure up defects or to
exaggerate the materiality of real defects, and to demand rescis-
sion rather than damages, regardless of which remedy minimizes
allocative costs. A similar incentive exists when the buyer realizes
that he has chosen an unsuitable product. As long as the legal
rules governing breach and remedy are sufficiently manipulable
to offer the buyer a significant opportunity for distributional
benefits, he will expend resources in negotiation or litigation in an
attempt to gain them. Indeed, a rational buyer will spend nearly
as much as the amount of the market price decline, discounted by
his probability of prevailing in court.
Two conclusions may be drawn from this analysis. First,
courts may reduce the parties' expenditures in attempts to gain
distributional benefits by making legal rules certain in application.
As legal rules become more certain, the probability of each party's
manipulating them to his advantage decreases, and hence he is
willing to spend less in such an effort. Second, the parties' expendi-
tures in attempts to achieve private benefits sometimes may be
greater -than the savings achieved by choosing the remedy which
otherwise would minimize allocative costs. For example, suppose
that the market price of the goods has dropped $xo since contract
formation, that the nonconformity in the goods is obviously trivial,
that the buyer's and seller's resale costs are small and equal, and
that the cost of shipment from buyer to seller is $4. If the buyer
can rescind, the net cost to the parties is the $4 shipment cost,
and the buyer avoids the market loss. If the buyer must accept
damages, the net cost to the parties is just the cost of determining
the buyer's damages, which is zero because the triviality of the
defect is obvious. Thus damages are the more efficient remedy.
"3 In common understanding, a sale allocates both the risk and the oppor-
tunity of price changes to the buyer. Just as the buyer accepts the risk of a
market decline, he gains the benefit of a rise in the market, for the seller cannot
opt out of a contract of sale simply to make a better bargain elsewhere.
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However, if the legal rules for choosing the remedy are manipu-
lable, in the case where the parties have equal probabilities of
prevailing (50% each), the buyer may expend up to $5 on litiga-
tion attempting to avoid his market loss by rescission. And the
seller may invest up to $5 in litigation trying to avoid bearing
the loss which he thought he contracted away. In such a case,
the joint expenditure on litigation may be $io, while the savings
from avoiding reshipment is only $4. Thus the remedy of dam-
ages remains the more efficient, but its true value is never
realized unless the legal rules are certain enough to discourage
expensive legal disputes.
If the parties to a sale were to negotiate a remedy for a non-
conforming tender explicitly, they probably would not limit them-
selves to an absolute choice between rescission and damages, but
would structure a more flexible remedy which would preserve
the allocation of risk implicit in a contract of sale at a fixed
price. Where allocative costs can be minimized by rescission, the
parties would maintain the distribution of risk by allowing the
seller to repair the defective tender 14 or to offset the decline in
market price against the purchase price to be returned to the
buyer. Either such remedy retains the cost advantages of the
seller's resale or repair of the defective goods without disturbing
the contractual allocation of risk. Similarly, where the goods
prove unsuitable to the buyer despite the triviality of the defects,
the allocation of risk can be maintained if the buyer reimburses
the seller for retrieving and reselling the goods, as well as for
depreciation. Even with such flexible remedies, however, there
will still be the incentive of distributional benefits as long as
,the contract is not enforced with certainty. Moreover, the cost
of uncertainty will exist whether these remedies are created by
the parties or enforced by a court. Since the cost of uncertainty
is inevitable and difficult to estimate, the flexibility of legal
rules will always make it difficult to determine the most efficient
remedy.
II. THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE NONCONFORMING
TENDER PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 2
A. Llewellyn's Influence
There is little doubt that Karl Llewellyn, the chief reporter
for the Uniform Commercial Code project, was the principal
4 The Code explicitly gives the seller a limited right to cure nonconforming
tenders. See U.C.C. § 2-5o8. For further discussion of this right, see pp. 971-74,
98o-8I, 999-ooo infra.
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architect of the Code's tender provisions.' 5 In the 1930's, prior
to his appointment as chief reporter, Llewellyn criticized the ten-
der provisions of the Uniform Sales Act and outlined his concep-
tion of more appropriate standards for the seller's tender and the
buyer's right to refuse defective goods. 16 The views Llewellyn
expressed during that period supplied the intellectual foundation
for the structure of the tender provisions which ultimately
emerged.
Llewellyn's objections to the tender provisions of the Sales
Act centered on the rigid "perfect tender rule" adopted from the
common law,'7 and on the equally rigid judicial counterrules which
that rule had engendered. Llewellyn believed that the perfect
tender rule allowed a buyer to rescind on the basis of trivial non-
conformities in the tender and to shift the risk of a declining
market back onto the seller.'8  He recognized that counterrules
limiting the buyer's right of rejection were no better, since they
often gave a seller extraordinary power to enforce a sale in bad
faith and so had become "a blackjack in the hands of any thug." 1'
Under the "unstated defect rule," for example, the buyer could
'5 See, e.g., Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of Which Karl N. Llewellyn is the
Hero of the Piece; or Searching for More Expansion Joints in Karl's Crum-
bling Cathedral, 12 B.C. INDus. & Com. L. REV. 139, 142 (,970); W. TwNNG,
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 270-301 (1973).
"0 See Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558, 564-68
(1940); Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society (pts. i & 2), 36 COLUM.
L. REV. 699 (1936), 37 CoLum. L. REV. 341 (I937) [hereinafter cited as Quality
I and Quality II].
Llewellyn's articles relied heavily on a series of student notes published while
he was a faculty member at Columbia Law School, e.g., Note, Return of Part of
the Goods Delivered Under a Sales Contract: Harmonizing Legal Theory and
Business Practice, 35 CoLum. L. REv. 726 (1935); Note, Application of the Doctrine
of Substantial Performance in the Law of Sales, 33 CoLum. L. REY. 1021 (1933);
Note, The Seller's Privilege to Correct an Improper Tender, 31 COLm. L. REV.
xoo5 (i93r). See Quality II, supra, at 367 nn.65 & 67, 384 n.Iio, 391 n.130.
7 Under the perfect tender rule, a buyer was empowered to rescind a sale when-
ever the goods-or the manner of their delivery-failed to conform exactly
and in every respect to the description in the contract. See, e.g., UNIFORM SALES
ACT §§ iI, 44, 69 (I9o6 version); 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 6, §§ 1155, 12o6, 1210.
This rule may be inefficient because the presence or absence of a defect is not
directly related to costs. Where, for example, goods have been specially designed for
the buyer, this rule is particularly likely to increase the cost of sales. Damages may
be the cheaper remedy since the buyer is likely to place a higher value on goods
made to his order than the market, even if the goods depart in some respect from
his specifications. Probably for this reason, buyers were apparently prohibited from
rejecting specially designed goods under both the common law and the Sales Act.
See Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 459, 464, 470
(1949).
" See Quality II, supra note i6, at 389.
19 Id. at 392.
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claim breach only on grounds of complaints made, however hur-
riedly, at the time of rescission.20 In addition, rescission was held
barred by acceptance of part of a shipment or acceptance of the
goods with knowledge of their defects.2 '
In his writing, Llewellyn proposed several methods of amelio-
rating the harshness and unpredictability of these rules. First, he
recommended a collection of intermediate remedies for non-
conforming tender disputes, such as allowing the seller to cure a
defect in the tender by retendering conforming goods or offering
a price concession, and allowing the buyer to reject only part of a
tender where only part failed to conform.22 Second, he proposed
that loss-shifting be discouraged by replacing the perfect tender
rule with a standard of substantial performance, allowing the
buyer to rescind only where the tender failed substantially to con-
form to the contract.23
Llewellyn recommended further that a distinction be made
between rescission by merchant and consumer buyers.24 Llewellyn
believed that where the buyer is the ultimate consumer, courts are
incompetent to determine whether a given defect in the goods re-
sults in a substantial impairment of their value to him. "Re-
scission for a minor defect," he argued, "is . . . essentially
an ultimate consumer's remedy: it fits the case of the wallpaper
which is just enough off-color, or the radio which is just enough
off true, to edge the nerves." 25 Llewellyn contended that mer-
chant buyers, more often than consumer buyers, were able to use
defective goods. He -and, later, Code advocates such as John
Honnold - vigorously opposed rescission by merchant buyers as
2 0 Id.; c. U.C.C. § 2-605 (unstated defect rule with limitations).
In 1935, Lawrence Eno published a study claiming that in two-thirds of all
cases in which the unstated defect rule had been invoked against buyers, the
price of the goods had dropped between agreement and performance. He con-
cluded that the rule was employed chiefly to prevent buyers from misusing the
perfect tender rule to shift market risks to sellers. See Eno, Price Movement
and Unstated Objections to the Defective Performance of Sales Contracts, 44
YALE L.J. 782, 814-17 (1935). See also Quality I, supra note 16, at 707 n.25, 7,5
& n-47; Quality II, supra note z6, at 390-92 & n.i31.
21 See Quality II, supra note 16, at 390-92. See also Note, Return of Part oj the
Goods Delivered Under a Sales Contract: Harmonizing Legal Theory and Busi-
ness Practice, 35 CoLum. L. REV. 726, 727-29 (i935).
22 Quality II, supra note 6, at 378, 389-91 & n.i3o.
2 3 Id. at 378, 398 & n.146.
2 4 1d. at 378 n.97, 388, 389.
He also recommended a more lenient standard for rescission where there were
defects in documents, which might prevent the buyer from collecting insurance
or from transferring the documents to a third party. See Llewellyn, Through
Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 159, 192 & nn.62-63
(x938) ; Quality IIH, supra note i6, at 378 n.97, 384, 389.
25 Quality II, supra note i6, at 388.
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long as the seller would grant the buyer a "price allowance" to
compensate for the defect.2 6 Both Llewellyn and Honnold seemed
to base their distinction between merchant and consumer buyers
on intuitively perceived differences in the costs of resale. Both
viewed the typical merchant buyer as a commodity broker - one
who frequently sells various grades of goods and therefore is able
to resell defective or subgrade goods more cheaply than the typical
consumer buyer, and often at a cost equal to that of the seller. For
such buyers, the remedy of damages - or its equivalent, a price
allowance - is more likely to minimize costs.
Llewellyn's proposals were not directly incorporated into the
text which eventually emerged from the drafting process. In
fact, the drafting committee reaffirmed, in what is now Code sec-
tion 2-6oi, the perfect tender rule for rescission. But while
Llewellyn was rebuffed on the content of the principal tender
provision, his influence appeared in other ways.
Llewellyn's proposal to limit the ability of buyers to shift
losses to sellers in a declining market was realized in several pro-
visions of the Code. Under section 2-508, the seller has the right
' See id. at 389 ("Mercantile (and manufacturing) buyers of gradable goods
can commonly, but not always, use goods which fit within the range of reasonable
mercantile adjustment."); Honnold, supra note 17, at 464-65, 471-72.
Llewellyn's proposal for price adjustment gained influence after Honnold re-
ported that the rules of trade associations and commodity exchanges commonly
provided for a price adjustment, rather than rejection, as the remedy for non-
conforming tenders. See id. at 464. The mere fact that a rule has been adopted by
a majority of members of a trade association, however, does not prove that it re-
duces costs for each member.
21 Llewellyn attempted to implement his proposals in the early drafts of the
Revised Sales Act. In the i941 draft, he introduced explicitly a distinction be-
tween merchant and consumer buyers, provided a standard of "mercantile per-
formance" for merchant buyers similar to substantial performance but based on
commercial custom, and set up panels of merchant experts to apply the standard
in individual cases. See REvisED UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ ii-A, 59 to 59-D (2d
draft 1941; Llewellyn papers, Univ. of Chicago Law School); Schwartz, supra
note 2, at 555 n.35. Llewellyn's proposed provision distinguished "exact perform-
ance," which could be adopted by agreement, from "mercantile performance," which
was satisfied if the goods possessed no substantial defect, "that is, when -
(i) the delivered lot is of such character as not in a material manner to increase
the risks or burdens which would rest on the buyer under exact performance
." REvISED UNFORM SALES ACT, supra, § ii-A.2(b).
By 1944, both the merchant-jury and the mercantile performance standard
had been rejected. See REViSED UN ORM SALEs ACT § 91 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1944). Handwritten annotations to Llewellyn's copy of the 1941 draft show
that the substantial performance standard was criticized as too general, not suffi-
ciently predictable, and encouraging of chiseling by unscrupulous sellers. REVISED
UNIFORM SALES AcT (2d draft 194), supra, at 101-04.
The only aspect of Llewellyn's proposal to establish a panel of merchant experts
that survived to the final draft was the incidental reference in Llewellyn's original
draft to course of performance and usage of trade. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 1-209, 2-208.
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to cure defects in goods which the buyer rejects as nonconforming.
Thus, if the buyer attempts to reject because of a decline in price,
the seller can repair the nonconformity to maintain the allocation
of risks in the contract. Though the buyer may still return the
goods after accepting, the standard for revocation of acceptance
is significantly higher than that for rejection. The buyer must
show that the defect was difficult to discover prior to acceptance
or that acceptance was induced by the seller's assurances of con-
formity or promises of cure. He must also show that the defect
substantially impairs the value of the goods to him.28 This higher
standard for revocation of acceptance is sensitive to attempts by
buyers to shift losses. When the buyer revokes acceptance, he has
possessed the goods for a longer period than when he rejects. The
passage of time increases both the likelihood of a change in the
market price and the buyer's opportunity to discover that he has
chosen unsuitable goods. Similarly, the Code provides a stricter
standard for rejection in installment contracts, where the time
between contract formation and performance typically is greater
than in a single delivery contract.29
Although Llewellyn's proposed distinction between merchant
and consumer buyers was not explicitly incorporated into the
general tender standard, several provisions of the Code create
such a distinction in practice. For example, section 2-504 pre-
cludes rejection where the seller has failed -to make a reasonable
contract for delivery or has failed to notify the buyer of ship-
ment unless the buyer has suffered "material delay or loss."
Section 2-6I4 precludes rejection, though the seller has failed to
comply with the agreed manner of delivery, as long as the seller
can show that strict compliance was "commercially impracticable."
These provisions do not by their terms distinguish between com-
mercial and consumer transactions, but they are more likely to
limit rescission by merchant buyers, who frequently specify the
time and manner of delivery in their contracts, than by consumer
buyers, for whom deliveries are usually over-the-counter. Simi-
larly, section 2-508, which controls the seller's cure of a defective
tender, is likely to affect merchant and consumer buyers differ-
ently. Subsection (i) allows a seller to cure defects within the
contractual time for delivery. More importantly, however, sub-
seotion (2) allows a seller "a further reasonable time" to cure the
defect if he had "reasonable grounds to believe" that the initial
2 8 U.C.C. § 2-608.
2f Where the defect is in a single installment, the buyer may reject only if the
defect is in the documents, cannot be cured, or substantially impairs the value of
the whole contract. Otherwise, the buyer must accept the installment if the seller
gives "adequate assurance of . . . cure." Id. § 2-612.
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tender would be acceptable to the buyer. This provision is more
likely to limit rescission by merchant buyers because it is chiefly
by virtue of an ongoing commercial relationship, such as that
between merchants, that a seller would have reason to believe a
nonconforming tender to be acceptable.
Finally, the higher standards for rejection in installment con-
tracts and for revocation of acceptance effectively differentiate
between merchant and consumer buyers. Installment contracts,
of course, predominantly involve merchant buyers. The sub-
stantial performance standard for revocation of acceptance may
also be interpreted as making revocation easier for consumers than
for merchants. Under that standard, a buyer may revoke accept-
ance if -the "nonconformity substantially impairs [the] value [of
the goods] to him." 30 As discussed earlier, Llewellyn thought
that rescission was especially appropriate for consumer buyers,
because he thought their personal values worthy of recognition.
It is plausible that the Code's draftsmen added the phrase "to
him" to enable courts to defer to the personal values of con-
sumers in determining the loss caused by the defect. The phrase
has little application and uncertain meaning for merchant buyers
since the value of defective goods on the resale market is likely to
be the same for one merchant as for another.
B. Inefficiencies Resulting from the Imprecision of
Llewellyn's Notions
The basic structure and fundamental distinctions of the tender
provisions of the Code derive from Llewellyn's proposals, which,
as we have seen, were often responsive to costs. While it is over-
statement to describe -the underlying policy of the Code's tender
provisions as the minimization of costs, many of the distinctions
incorporated into the Code can be explained, in hindsight, as
rational responses to the desire to choose the cheaper remedy. Yet
because Llewellyn's perception of the relative costs of the reme-
dies was intuitive and imprecise, and because his objectives were
compromised in the course of drafting, specific provisions of the
Code depart from cost minimization. As a result, a literal inter-
pretation of the Code will increase -the costs of sales transactions
in certain common situations involving defective tenders.
The seller's cure of a defective tender provides an initial ex-
ample. Llewellyn perceived correctly that the joint costs of breach
can be reduced if the seller can cure at a cost less than the diminu-
tion in the value of the goods because of the defect.31 Yet he failed
30 Id. § 2-6o8(I) (emphasis added).
3' See Quality II, supra note 16, at 389. But see Schwartz, supra note 2, at
547-,56 (emphasis on high subjective costs to buyer of being forced to retain re-
paired rather than new goods).
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to appreciate that the discrepancy between the costs imposed on
the seller where the buyer recovers damages and where the buyer
successfully rejects will tempt the seller to invest in cure whether
or not the value of the goods is enhanced. Where the buyer re-
covers damages, the seller who fails to cure loses an amount equal
to the diminution in the value of the goods because of the defect.
This amount establishes an upward constraint on his investment
consistent with the joint maximization of value. Where the buyer
successfully rejects, however, the seller loses the same amount, as
well as the costs of retrieval and resale and the depreciation of the
goods while in the buyer's hands. His incentive to invest in cure
therefore is increased by the total of these other costs. A decline
in the market price of the goods before rejection increases the
seller's incentive to invest in cure still further. In either case, the
amount invested may be significantly greater than the value of
the investment in cure, and the difference will increase the joint
costs to the parties from the breach.
The difference in practice between the standards for rejection
and revocation of acceptance by merchant buyers and consumer
buyers is susceptible to similar criticism. Though this difference
has a foundation in efficiency, the rules of the Code implement-
ing it are only crudely related to cost minimization. In
general, merchants have lower costs of resale than consumer
buyers, so that damages will more often be the cheaper remedy.
But not every merchant buyer is able to resell defective goods
as cheaply as the seller. Rather, the cost of reselling defective
goods is a function of the nature of the particular defect and of the
specialization in the buyer's resale trade. The appropriate ques-
tion for cost minimization is the relative resale costs of the buyer
and seller. There will be a continuum of merchants' and con-
sumers' resale costs overlapping a similar continuum of those of
sellers, so that any broad distinction between merchants and
consumers, while efficient in general, will fail in particular cases.
Furthermore, the implementation of the distinction - by a
substantial performance standard as opposed to a perfect tender
rule - is not directly related to minimization of costs. A defect
may be literally "insubstantial," but if the merchant buyer's mar-
ket is specialized, his costs of reselling defective goods may be
higher than 'the seller's, so that rejection minimizes costs. If the
buyer's resale trade is general, it may be less costly for him to sell
goods that fail to conform in substantial respects. For example,
if a manufacturer sends a sporting goods store baseballs instead
of golf balls, the nonconformity is substantial, but there is no
reason to presume that rejection will minimize costs.
The same may be said about the standards for rejection and
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revocation of acceptance. Where the buyer has retained the goods
for a period of time before attempting to return them, it is more
likely that the market price or the buyer's information'about the
goods has changed, but the concept of -the "substantiality" of the
defect does not precisely capture the effect. Moreover, a defect
may be sufficiently serious to raise the buyer's costs of resale
above the seller's - so that rescission is the cheaper remedy -
although it may not satisfy the substantiality criterion of the
Code. Finally, the more lenient standard for revocation by con-
sumer buyers, based on the acknowledgment of their personal
values, may also increase the costs of breach. There is little reason
to believe that consumers, any more than merchants, will fail to
see the advantage of revoking where the market price of the goods
has declined. Deferring to the personal values of consumer buy-
ers also exposes sellers to the risk of revocation and the incentive
to overinvest in cure where the buyer has chosen unwisely and
has found the goods to be unsuitable.
These criticisms suggest that there are significant discrepan-
cies between the effect of the Code's provisions and the ideal of
cost minimization. As a consequence, the role of the courts in
interpreting and applying the provisions of the Code will be ex-
tremely important in determining its practical effect on costs. It
is the hypothesis of this Article that the courts have interpreted
the Code's provisions in ways that minimize costs in nonconform-
ing tender disputes. As background for investigation of this hypo-
thesis, the next Part analyzes the specific tender provisions more
carefully to discover interpretations that might minimize costs
and to identify statutory limitations on the ability of the courts to
achieve efficiency in sales.
III. COST MINIMIZATION AND THE TENDER PROVISIONS
OF THE CODE
This Part examines the text of the Code's tender provisions
with respect to rejection, revocation and cure. It compares each
provision with economic analysis and considers how courts con-
cerned with reducing the costs of sales might interpret the specific
provisions.
A. Rejection
Under section 2-6Ol of the Code, the buyer has the right to
choose between the remedies of damages and rejection if the
tender fails to conform to the contract in any respect. The buyer's
discretion to select the remedy, however, is not wholly unfettered.
If he does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership of the
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tendered goods, the buyer is deemed to have accepted them under
section 2-6o6. Moreover, the buyer must notify the seller of
rejection within a reasonable time after delivery or tender.82
Even after rejection is effective, the seller may cure a defective
tender, as discussed below."
Although a buyer has been denied rejection, he still may re-
cover damages under section 2-714. His recovery, however, is
limited by section 2-607(3) to cases in which he has notified the
seller of the defects within "a reasonable time after he discovers
or should have discovered any breach." These "notice" and
"reasonable time" requirements are textually quite similar to the
requirements for effective rejection. Therefore, a court denying
rejection by invoking one of these requirements also must deny
damages, unless it can find the content or timing of a buyer's
notification insufficient for a rejection claim but sufficient for a
damage claim. To make a principled distinction, however, would
require considerable ingenuity. 4 As a result, a court's ability to
award a damage remedy rather than rejection is likely to depend
heavily upon its interpretation of the "act inconsistent" provision
of section 2-6o6, which precludes rejection but not an award of
damages.
In order to provide the cost-effective remedy for a defective
tender, a court might define an "act inconsistent with the seller's
ownership" as one which shows that the buyer's loss from the
defect is less than either the diminution in market value of the
goods due to the defect or the seller's costs of retrieving and re-
selling them. For example, the buyer's use or adaptation of the
defective goods to fit his particular needs is strong evidence that
rejection is not the cost-effective remedy, since the buyer's act
shows that the value of the goods to him is likely to exceed their
market value. Invoking the "act inconsistent" provision to deny
rejection is therefore appropriate because the buyer's own act -
adaptation of the goods - discloses that damages are the cheaper
remedy.35
A court can apply the "notice" and "reasonable time" require-
ments in a similar way. Because the buyer's failure to satisfy these
requirements leads to the denial of both rejection and damages,
however, the requirements are most likely to be applied where a
3 2 U.C.C. § 2-602(I).
33 See pp. 98o-8i infra.
11 But see U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4.
35 Interpretation of the "act inconsistent" provision on purely legal grounds
has been found confusing and inconsistent. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HAND-
BOOK Or THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 251-53 (972) (provision
is "obstreperous"; courts seem to use it as a means of justifying preconceived re-
sults). But see pp. 98g-9i infra.
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court has concluded that the contract was not breached. In such
a case, the content of -the buyer's rejection notice and its timing
relative to the discovery of the defect are valuable contempora-
neous evidence of the buyer's real attitude toward the defects be
alleges. A court may use this evidence to balance the diminution
in value of the goods due to the defect against the cost of cor-
recting it and to detect the buyer's attempt to shift losses onto the
seller.
Judicial interpretation of the requirements of rejection and
notification within a reasonable time also can make the process
of rejection more efficient. The "reasonable" time for rejection
can be defined as the time that minimizes joint costs to the parties.
This cost-minimizing time is a function, first, of the cost to the
buyer of discovering the defect, either by inspection or through an
attempt to use the goods, and, second, of the depreciation of the
goods during the period that they are in the buyer's hands but not
yet accepted.
No particular provision of the Code takes account of the
relative costs of the buyer and the seller of reselling defective
goods, or of the costs of calculating the buyer's damages. Never-
theless, the reasonable time and notice requirements, as well as the
"act inconsistent" provision, are susceptible to creative interpreta-
tion to provide the most efficient remedy. As the difficulty of de-
termining the buyer's damages becomes more apparent to a court,
for example, the "reasonableness" of the buyer's attempt to re-
ject becomes more evident. Similarly, courts may be more likely
to award rejection where the costs to the buyer of reselling the
defective goods are high and where there is evidence that the loss
to the buyer from the defect is greater than the decline it caused
in the market value of the goods.
B. Revocation of Acceptance
Section 2-608 of the Code provides that a buyer may call off
the deal and return the goods to the seller even after acceptance
if he can show the following: (i) he reasonably assumed that the
seller would cure the defect, or he was induced to accept by the
difficulty of discovering the defect or by the seller's assurances
of conformity or cure; (2) the nonconformity of the tender "sub-
stantially impairs its value to him"; and (3) he revoked within a
reasonable time after he discovered or should have discovered
the defect and "before any substantial change in condition of the
goods which is not caused by their own defects." In addition,
the revocation is not effective until the seller is notified.
The justifications which the buyer must make for his initial
acceptance generally are consistent with cost minimization. As
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discussed above, where it is difficult - that is, more costly- to
discover a defect immediately upon tender rather than after initial
use or prolonged inspection, forcing the buyer fully to inspect
before acceptance increases costs. Similarly, it is understandable
for a buyer to attempt to reduce costs by omitting or delaying
inspection after the seller has given assurances that the goods
conform or that he will cure any defects.36 To reduce the costs
of delayed inspection where delay is unwarranted, the Code dis-
courages the seller from offering misleading assurances by penal-
izing him with an award of revocation, unless his assurances as
to conformity are accurate and his assurances of cure are fulfilled.
The notice and reasonable time requirements for revocation
are similar to those for rejection.37 Therefore, we might expect
courts sensitive to the cost of sales to interpret the requirements
in the same way, as encouraging consideration of evidence of the
buyer's loss from the defect, the cost of discovering the defect, and
depreciation of the goods while in the buyer's possession. This in-
terpretation is given force by the express requirement that there
be no substantial change in condition of the goods not caused by
their own defects 3s an obvious response to the greater likeli-
hood of depreciation where the buyer is trying to return the goods
after having accepted them. In addition, where the goods them-
selves have a limited lifetime, as in the case of perishables or
seasonal fashions, the provision encourages the buyer to acceler-
ate his inspection and testing procedures to avoid losses due to
delay. Finally, as in cases of rejection, courts may interpret the
provision creatively in response to evidence that damages are the
cheaper remedy.
The chief difference between the standards for rejection and
revocation of acceptance is the requirement that, to revoke ac-
ceptance, the buyer must show that the defect in the tender "sub-
stantially impairs its value. to him." While the requirement of
substantiality gives a court considerable discretion to award rev-
ocation only where it is the cheaper remedy, the modifying
phrase "to him," which makes personal values of the buyer de-
terminative, may lead to the opposite result. Comment 2 to sec-
tion 2-608 advises that the phrase "to him" was intended to pre-
clude consideration of the seller's ability to foresee the effect of the
nonconformity on the buyer.39 This interpretation would, by
See U.C.C. § 2-608, Comment 3.
" Compare id. § 2-608(2) with id. § 2-602().
2 Id. 2-608(2).
39
For this purpose the test is not what the seller had reason to know at the
time of contracting; the question is whether the non-conformity is such
as will in fact cause a substantial impairment of value to the buyer though
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providing a subjective standard for substantial impairment, ren-
der the seller's position more uncertain and hence decrease the
expected value of the contract. Therefore, courts which desire to
interpret the Code so as to minimize costs are likely to ignore the
Comment and interpret the phrase ".to him" as implicating all of
the buyer's loss from the nonconformity except that part which is
purely subjective and unforeseeable.
An obvious oversight in the drafting of section 2-6o8 is that
the Code does not compensate the seller for the depreciation of
the goods, or for the buyer's use of them, during the period after
acceptance and before revocation. Thus the buyer granted rev-
ocation gains as a private benefit the value of his use of the
goods during his possession. This additional private benefit is
likely to encourage the seller to incur greater settlement or litiga-
tion costs in an attempt to avoid revocation. A court could in-
voke the "substantial impairment" provision, or the "substantial
change in the condition of the goods" provision, to preclude revo-
cation where the depreciation of the goods or the value of the
buyer's use had been appreciable. Where revocation is otherwise
the more efficient remedy, however, such a resolution presents
courts with the dilemma of having to award the less efficient
remedy or provide a windfall to the buyer.
This analysis has general implications for differences between
rejection and revocation of acceptance cases. The chief practical
difference under the Code is that the buyer is likely to have pos-
sessed the goods for a longer period of time when he revokes ac-
ceptance than when he rejects. If the "reasonable time" limit for
both rejection and revocation of acceptance is determined by
reference to the costs of discovering the defect, then revocation
cases are likely to involve defects that are relatively more costly
to discover than those in rejection cases. Since the costs of dis-
covering defects are typically higher for consumer buyers than
for merchant buyers, it is plausible that a greater proportion of
revocation cases than of rejection cases will consist of suits
brought by consumers. Furthermore, since the remedy of return-
ing the goods to the seller is more likely, in general, to minimize
costs if the buyer is a consumer than a merchant, we can predict
that a greater proportion of revocation than of rejection suits will
be successful.4 ° These predictions, however, must remain ten-
tative because it is impossible to predict how courts will resolve
the seller had no advance knowledge as to the buyer's particular circum-
stances.
Id. § 2-608, Comment 2.
4 0 Differences in sales custom and willingness to litigate are alternative bases
for the same prediction. See note iI6 infra.
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the problem of the increased distributional loss to the seller from
the greater use of the goods by the buyer prior to revocation.
C. Cure of Defective Tender
Subsection (i) of section 2-508 gives the seller an absolute
right to cure before the time for performance, while subsection
(2) extends that right "a further reasonable time" if the seller
had reasonable grounds to believe that the initial tender would be
acceptable "with or without a money allowance." There is no
clear explanation in the Code of the consequences of the seller's
failure to satisfy the cure requirements. The only explicit refer-
ence to a remedy for failure to cure occurs in section 2-6o8(i) (a),
which provides that the buyer may revoke acceptance if the sel-
ler has not "seasonably cured" the nonconformity. It would,
however, be anomalous to force the buyer to meet the stricter
standards for revocation of acceptance merely because the seller
had attempted to cure, though he had failed to do so." It would
therefore seem to follow that the buyer's rejection becomes effec-
tive upon the seller's failure to cure.
These provisions give a court scant authority to control a
seller's excessive investment in cure. Prior to the time for per-
formance, there are no limits to a seller's cure. In reviewing at-
tempts to cure after the time for performance, a court can find
that the seller did not complete the cure within a "further reason-
able time" or that he did not have reasonable grounds to believe
that the initial defective tender would be acceptable to the buyer.
But both of these findings are likely to follow attempts by buyers
to reject goods despite the seller's investment in cure, after the
costs of cure have been sunk. Although a court conceivably could
deny a seller the right to cure because a "reasonable time" had
passed, the consequence of such a finding under the Code is an
award of rejection or revocation. Neither such remedy may mini-
mize costs since the seller is especially likely to invest excessive
amounts in cure where the price of the goods has dropped or the
buyer has obtained new information about the goods subsequent
to the agreement. Under 'these conditions, an award of rejection
or revocation will grant a windfall to the buyer. Thus the letter of
the Code provides two unsatisfactory alternatives: either (i)
41 Since the seller's right to cure is triggered by the buyer's rejection, see
U.C.C. § 2-508, in most cases of cure there will be no acceptance to revoke. How-
ever, if the tender were defective in an insubstantial manner, and the seller im-
mediately promised a cure, thus forestalling rejection, the buyer might be pre-
cluded from revoking acceptance later under the substantial performance standard.
The cases, however, have refused to interpret the Code so literally and in a manner
so at variance with its intent. See pp. 994-95 infra.
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denial of rejection or revocation and the consequent encourage-
ment of overinvestment in cure, or (2) a grant of rejection or
revocation and the consequent windfall to the buyer. A court
could escape this predicament if it could prohibit further cure
and limit the buyer to damages, but the letter of the Code does
not grant such a power. Since both the buyer's windfall and the
seller's overinvestment in cure increase the costs of contracts, it
is uncertain how courts will decide cases involving the seller's
cure, however avidly they may desire to minimize the costs of
sales. 2
IV. COST MINIMIZATION AND THE COURTS:
CODE JURISPRUDENCE, 1954-1976
In this Part, we examine various judicial decisions in cases
arising under the Uniform Commercial Code to test the hy-
pothesis that courts apply Code law so as to minimize the costs
of sales. The hypothesis might seem implausible at first because
judicial opinions neither refer explicitly to the criterion of ef-
ficiency nor compare the costs and benefits of one holding with
those of another, as might a consulting firm or a regulatory
agency. Nevertheless, there are several good reasons for our in-
quiry. First, in the long run, both buyers and sellers benefit
from cost-minimizing rules for sales. As we have shown, efficiency
is likely to conform to the "intent" of the parties, and it is un-
likely that societal interests in a private sale are strong enough
to justify overriding the benefits to the parties themselves. Thus,
it is a compelling claim or defense on policy grounds for a party
to a nonconforming tender case to show that a particular interpre-
tation of a rule will make it more difficult - that is, more costly
- to perform such a contract in the future. Second, as the
analysis of specific tender provisions has shown, a concern for
42 The same sort of economic analysis can be applied to installment contracts,
defined by the Code as contracts for separate delivery and acceptance of separate
lots, U.C.C. § 2-612. Since installment contracts typically remain outstanding
over longer periods of time than single-sale contracts, they entail a greater like-
lihood of private benefits and consequently a greater incentive both for the buyer
to fabricate reasons for cancellation and for the seller to invest resources to pre-
vent it. In addition, installment contracts are likely to involve a greater value
of goods than single-sale contracts and therefore to permit private benefits of still
greater significance.
Though the substantial performance standard for installment contracts, see
id., is similar to that for revocation of acceptance, see id. § 2-6o8(i), the greater
danger of private benefits in the former suggests that courts sensitive to costs may
be less likely to find "substantial impairment" where a buyer seeks cancellation
of an installment contract than where he seeks to revoke acceptance in an isolated
sale.
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minimizing costs is reflected in many of the purely legal require-
ments and distinctions embodied in the Code. This suggests
that, although the language of judicial opinions is ordinarily de-
void of economic concepts, the judicial principles may derive from
an underlying concern in the law for efficiency. Finally, a show-
ing that judges in general decide cases as if they were attempting
consciously to minimize the costs of nonconforming tenders would
enhance the predictability of judicial outcomes in individual cases.
There are two principal ways of testing the hypothesis that
courts interpret the provisions of the Code so as to achieve
efficiency. The first and best test is to compare the judgment
rendered in a given case with the efficient result, derived from
balancing the costs and benefits as discussed in Part I. This test
is limited, however, by the fact that the only available informa-
tion on costs is that drawn from the opinions themselves, which
may not be accurate or complete. A second method for testing
the hypothesis is to observe whether the facts that the court
views as determinative of its legal holding are similar to those
which would be determinative in an economic judgment. If le-
gal rules, regardless of their terminology, give controlling weight
to factors bearing on efficiency, it is likely in general that ju-
dicial decisions will be consistent with efficiency.4" In testing the
cost minimization hypothesis under these methods, the author
reviewed every reported decision from 1954 through 1976 in
cases involving the buyer's attempt to return goods to the seller
due to their failure to conform to the contract. In all, 183 cases
were reviewed, of which 78 involved a rejection issue, 99 an is-
sue of revocation of acceptance, 50 the seller's cure, and 12 an
installment contract issue.44 The litigation studied was not dom-
" A third test is comparison of the ease and consistency of judicial resolution
of disputes in different categories of cases. The analysis offered here implies that
courts are more likely to achieve efficient outcomes consistently in rejection and
revocation cases than in cure and installment contracts cases because the structure
of the Code and the context of the dispute in cure and installment cases make dis-
tributive effects relatively more significant there.
" The sum of these figures exceeds 183 because certain cases involved multiple
issues, e.g., cure and revocation.
The principal source for this study was the Uniform Commercial Code Re-
porting Service, which attempts to compile all reported trial and appellate
decisions enforcing or interpreting the Code. The author has also reviewed all
relevant decisions discovered incidentally in other sources.
Limitations of space naturally precluded citing all arguably relevant cases
for each point discussed in text. However, the author has endeavored to provide
the clearest examples and counterexamples of consistency with the economic
analysis. Lists of all the cases reviewed by the author, classified according to
region, temporal distribution, and relevant legal issue, are on file at the Harvard
Law Review and are available from the author.
It should be noted that the standard for interpretation of these cases is differ-
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inated by the decisions of any single jurisdiction, any particular
geographic region, or any particular period of time.
A. Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance
i. Rejection: Interpreting the Contract.- Where the buyer
in a rejection case claims that the goods are defective with re-
spect to a characteristic not explicitly described in the contract,
a court is required to determine whether or not there has been
a breach. The cost minimization hypothesis implies that the
court will do so by comparing the cost to the seller of avoiding
the alleged defect with the loss suffered by the buyer because
of it.
Decisions in this area are consistent with efficiency. One,
for example, inferred conformity of the tender from behavior
of the buyer- reordering identical goods after discovery of the
alleged defect.4 ' Here the costs of breach might have been avoid-
ed if the buyer had acted upon the information -in his possession
before the disputed order.
In other cases, the tender, although failing to conform to the
letter of the contract, conformed to "customary standards" in the
trade 46 or conformed to goods tendered earlier, and was held to
have been accepted by a past course of dealing between the
parties.4 7 These decisions were consistent with the Code's ex-
plicit adoption of both the "course of dealing" between parties
and the "usage of trade" in an industry as criteria of contract
interpretation 48 criteria which themselves promote efficiency
by encouraging buyers to take advantage of economies in infor-
mation achieved through standardization, trade custom, and es-
tablished routines of trade.49
ent from that usually employed in legal analysis. Courts seldom, if ever, use eco-
nomic jargon or mention economic criteria in their opinions. (For an example to
the contrary, see note 8x infra.) Therefore the standard for interpretation here
is not whether the court explicitly adverts to efficiency as a ground for the deci-
sion, but whether the result of its decision is consistent with efficiency as far as
the efficient remedy or course of action can be inferred from facts given in the
opinion. Where the facts are ambiguously specified in the opinion, reasonable in-
ferences are made.
4
'See Herman H. Sticht Co. v. Bradford Equip. Co., i8 Ches. Co. Rep.
305, 5o Pa. D. & C.2d 265 (C.P. 197o).
4 See Wakerman Leather Co. v. Irvin B. Foster Sportswear Co., 34 A.D.2d
594, 595, 3o8 N.Y.S.2d io3, io5 (mem.) (upholding trial court's finding that
goods were merchantable), leave to appeal denied, 26 N.Y.2d 614, 311 N.Y.S.2d
1026 (X970).
47 See BoMyte Co. v. L-Co Cabinet Corp., 4o Northumberland L.J. 172 (Pa.
C.P. 1968), aff'd. nere. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 811, 270 A.2d 253 (,970).4 See U.C.C. §§ X-205, 2-2o8.
49 In several cases, courts gave effect to the parties' agreement on procedures
for rejection - a course of action which promotes efficiency for the same reasons
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2. The Reasonable Time for Rejection and Revocation of
Acceptance. -Part III predicted that courts will define "rea-
sonable time" by balancing the cost to the buyer of discovering
the defect with the cost to the seller of delay in discovery,
typically depreciation of the goods prior to rejection or revoca-
tion, and that courts will deny relief where either the time or
manner of the buyer's rejection or revocation indicates that the
tender, though alleged to be defective, actually complied with
the contract. In general, case law under the Code confirms these
predictions. In Michael M. Berlin & Co. v. T. Whiting Manu-
facturing, Inc.," for example, there was a contract for the sale
of sheet steel, .09o inches thick. The first delivery was made on
April 25, and other shipments were made in May. The buyer,
however, did not inspect the steel until early June, when diffi-
culties in its use led to the discovery that the steel was only .o8o
inches thick and therefore unsuitable for the buyer's purposes.
The buyer attempted to reject by letter on July 29, but the sel-
ler, who was only a broker, refused to take back the steel, claim-
ing that the original supplier refused responsibility because of
the lapse of time. Upon the seller's suit to recover the purchase
price, the court framed the legal question as the reasonableness
of the buyer's conduct in delaying inspection of the goods until
six weeks after delivery and in waiting another seven weeks be-
fore rejecting them. The court concluded that the buyer had
not rejected within a reasonable time."
The Berlin court's justification for its decision illustrates how
the costs and benefits of delaying or accelerating inspection and
rejection are given controlling weight in the resolution of a legal
dispute:
The court finds that an inspection of the steel to determine
its thickness could.have been made with a minimum of effort.
The inspection presented no difficulty. . . .In addition, the
change of plaintiff's position with its source of supply must be
considered. . . .The prejudicial position of plaintiff could have
been avoided by inspection and rejection of the steel by the de-
fendant within the reasonable time contemplated by the pertinent
provisions of the UCC.52
as does adherence to trade custom. See, e.g., SCA Int'l, Inc. v. Garfield & Rosen,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 246, 248-49 (D. Mass. 1971) (agreement on seller's consent
before rejection); Max Bauer Meat Packer, Inc. v. United States, 458 F.2d 88
(Ct. CI. 1972) (agreement on rejection procedure); Koppers Co. v. Brunswick
Corp., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 250, 261-63, 3o3 A.2d 32, 38-39 (X973) (agreement on
time for rejection).
505 U.C.C. Rep. 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. x968).
51 d. at 36o.52 Id.
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It is not certain that the Berlin court's decision minimized
costs in fact. The opinion does not fully explain why the original
supplier refused to permit the return of the goods or how the
risk of the supplier's refusal was allocated by the buyer and sell-
er in the contract of sale. Nevertheless, once the court had iden-
tified for itself the relevant costs of the transaction, it decided
the case so as to minimize them. The delay was found unrea-
sonable when the court saw that the cost to the seller could have
been avoided "with a minimum of effort" on the buyer's part.
Other decisions interpreting the Code's "reasonable time"
requirement do not compare the costs and benefits of delay as
explicitly. However, many opinions give controlling weight to
the seller's loss of the use of the goods or to the effect of the
delay on the buyer's cost of inspection. In Societ Nouvelle
Vaskene v. Lehman Saunders, Ltd., 3 for example, the buyer re-
jected clothing purchased wholesale from France three and one-
half months after receipt of the first shipment and one month
after inspection, claiming that the clothing was improperly sized
for the American market. After noting that the goods were
seasonal in nature, the court held that the three-and-one-half-
month delay was unreasonable under the Code. 54 The court
stressed that the buyer had recognized the improper sizing when
the garments first had been unpacked to be placed on the sales
floor. Thus, the court seemed to be responding either to the loss
occasioned by the passing of the season, unbalanced by any dif-
ficulty of the buyer in rejecting more promptly, or to the buyer's
implied acceptance of the risk of resale despite the defect. In
either case, the result was consistent with efficiency.
Similar cases support the view that courts find delay in re-
jecting or revoking acceptance unreasonable when it is unex-
cused by the buyer's costs and imposes substantial costs on the
seller. The buyer's delay has been held unreasonable where it
prevented the seller from curing the defect; 55 or from reinspect-
ing the goods, as the parties had agreed, to confirm the noncon-
formity; " and where the cost to the buyer of inspecting and re-
53 X4 U.C.C. Rep. 692 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
" Id. at 693. Cf. Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 78 Wash. 2d 343, 348-49,
474 P.2d 270, 273 (,970) (revocation of acceptance of Christmas toys); A.C.
Carpenter, Inc. v. Boyer Potato Chips, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 493, 495, 28 Agric. Dec. 1557,
i56o (1969) (revocation of acceptance of perishable potatoes).
55 See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 250, 263-64,
3o3 A.2d 32, 39-40 (,973).
"
0 See, e.g., Max Bauer Meat Packer, Inc. v. United States, 458 F.2d 88, 93
(Ct. CI. 9792); Mazur Bros. & Jaffe Fish Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 419, 423-24, 65-2
Contract App. Dec. 23,303, 23,305 (Vet. Admin. Contract App. Ed. 1965).
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jecting the goods was particularly low so that there was no jus-
tification for delay.57
On the other hand, where the costs imposed on the seller are
relatively small, or the buyer's costs of early inspection and re-
jection are relatively substantial, the "reasonable time" require-
ment is found to be satisfied. In one case, the delay in the buyer's
notification of rejection was found to be reasonable under the
Code precisely because the seller had suffered no loss whatso-
ever from the delay.58 In another set of cases, courts excused
extended delay in inspection and revocation where the costs of
discovering defects at an earlier time were substantial.5 9  For
example, in Cervitor Kitchens, Inc. v. Chapman,10 the Washing-
ton Supreme Court found a building contractor's three-month
delay in inspecting kitchen units to be installed in a building
under construction insufficient to constitute acceptance. Although
the buyer's engineer had witnessed the delivery of the goods and
their defects were apparent once they were unboxed, the court
affirmed the finding that the delay was reasonable because it
was customary in the building trade to store commercial fixtures
on a job site without inspecting them prior to installation."' Dis-
senting on other grounds, one justice gave a precise justification
for the custom: it "would have exposed the units to unnecessary
risk of damage to have unpacked them until just before instal-
lation." 62
This apparent judicial concern for the minimization of costs
" See, e.g., ITT-Indus. Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, 461,
229 S.E.2d 814, 821-22 (1976).
"
8 See Th. Van Huijstee, N.V. v. Faehndrich, io U.C.C. Rep. 598 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
,972) (dictum).
5 See, e.g., White Devon Farm v. Stahl, 389 N.Y.S.2d 724, 728-29 (Sup. Ct.
1976); Rose v. Epley Motor Sales, 288 N.C. 53, 61, 215 S.E.2d 573, 578 (1975);
Q. Vandenberg & Sons, N.V. v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 392, 399, 204 A.2d 494, 498
(x964); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., x6 Wash. App. 39, 48-49, 554
P.2d 349, 356-57 (1976). Similarly, where the seller has assured the buyer that the
goods conform to the contract, it is less likely that the buyer will incur inspection
costs, and courts have permitted extended delay prior to revocation. See, e.g.,
Trailmobile Div. of Pullman, Inc. v. Jones, II8 Ga. App. 472, 475, 264 S.E.2d
346, 348 (2968) ; Birkner v. Purdon, 27 Mich. App. 476, 482, 183 N.W.2d 598, 6ox
(1970); Lawner v. Engelbach, 433 Pa. 321, 316, 249 A.2d 295, 298 (1969).
6082 Wash. 2d 673, 678, 513 P.2d 25, 28 (1973) (affirming trial court finding).
61 Rejection was denied, however, because the buyer's installation was held
to be inconsistent with the seller's ownership. Id. at 676, 513 P.2d at 26-27.6 2 1d. at 679, 513 P.2d at 28 (Wright, J., dissenting). For a similar holding,
see La Villa Fair v. Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 548 P.2d 825 (2976).
In a similar case, the court excused a six-week delay in rejecting electronic
accounting equipment, emphasizing that the complexity of the machine and the
variety of possible defects made it difficult to determine whether the equipment
conformed to the contract. Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 362 F.
Supp. 325, 33o-31 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
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in the process of rejection has led one court to hold that the rea-
sonable time for rejection expires immediately upon, or perhaps
prior to, the seller's completion of the tender. In L. J. Robin-
son, Inc. v. Arber Construction Co.,63 the seller tendered fill dirt
for use at a construction site. Though a supervisory employee
of the buyer was present during each delivery, it was not dis-
covered until after 14i loads of dirt had been delivered that the
dirt failed to meet contract specifications. The court denied re-
jection, finding that the buyer's employee could have inspected
and discovered the nonconformities before the dirt had been
spread and rolled in place.
It is important to note that the source of this holding is not
the text of the Code. Although section 2-606 establishes liability
for the buyer's delay, it gives the buyer time to consider whether
or not he will reject by providing that "acceptance does not oc-
cur until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect
[the goods] ." 6 If "delivery" is defined as the dumping of the dirt
at the site, the reasonable time for inspection was practically zero
because the dirt was rolled and spread immediately after dump-
ing.6 5 On the other hand, delivery might have been defined as
the entire process of dumping, rolling and spreading the fill dirt,
since parts of the opinion indicate that the seller was responsible
for the entire process. Under such an interpretation of "delivery,"
the court's decision implies that the reasonable time for rejec-
tion expired before completion of the tender 66 - an interpretation
directly at odds with the language of sections 2-606 and 2-
602(I).
Either construction represents the subordination of the letter
of the Code to the court's desire to minimize costs. In more typ-
ical sales cases, the costs of tender are sunk by the time the
buyer becomes able to inspect the goods. Thus the Code pro-
vision giving the buyer a "reasonable time" to inspect and reject
after tender is a useful tool for cost minimization. In cases like
Robinson, however, the amount that the seller expends on tender
depends on actions taken by the buyer. If the Code were in-
terpreted literally in these cases to immunize the buyers from
responsibility for their actions, resources might be expended on
tender beyond the benefit to the contract.
We have predicted that the requirement of rejection or rev-
ocation within a reasonable time will also serve as a tool for
83 292 A.2d 809 (D.C. 1972) (affirming trial court judgment).
04 See also U.C.C. § 2-6c2(i) ("Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable
time after their delivery or tender." (emphasis added)).
05 See LJ. Robinson, Inc. v. Arber Constr. Co., 292 A.2d at 811 (by inference).
"a See id. at 812 (by inference).
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denying relief where the time or manner of the buyer's rejection
indicates that the contract has not really been breached. Sev-
eral decisions have so employed that requirement. In Hudspeth
Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson,67 for example, the buyer bought a
used truck, allegedly under the assurance that the engine was
not burning oil. In fact, as the buyer discovered on the first day
of use, it consumed substantial quantities of oil. The buyer did
not formally reject the truck until five months later, after the
engine had "blown up." The court denied rejection on the ground
that the buyer had failed to reject within a reasonable time.
There are a variety of alternative legal grounds for denying
the buyer in Hudspeth relief, each of which might be consistent
with cost minimization. The court might have disbelieved the
buyer's claim of warranty; it might have decided that the buyer
of a used truck assumes the risk of engine failure; or it might
have believed that the buyer failed to mitigate damages after
discovering that the engine used oil. The requirement of rejec-
tion within a reasonable time, however, is particularly suitable
for the resolution of this dispute because the provision focuses
attention on the importance of the passage of time after discov-
ery of the defect to the contractual allocation of risks. As dis-
cussed in Part II, the passage of time after sale or after discov-
ery of a defect increases the likelihood that the buyer's rejection
is based upon a supervening event, the risk of which is not al-
located in the contract. In Hudspeth, the buyer could not show
that the supervening event - explosion of the engine - was due
to a defect present at the time of sale; so it is not implausible that
allocation of this risk to the buyer would reduce the joint cost
of sales.
The widely noted case of Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc.",
illustrates the same point. There, the Second Circuit affirmed
a finding that a delay of twenty-four hours prior to the rejection
of a racehorse was unreasonable. Evidence showed that it is
customary, because it is easy, to inspect the condition of a race-
horse at the time of purchase. The buyer's delay, however short,
increased the likelihood that the defect - a fracture in the horse's
leg - really had occurred after the buyer had taken possession.
The court noted that risk of injury to a racehorse after sale, is
sufficiently great to justify the custom that the buyer ignored.10
3. The Requirement of Notification of Rejection and Revo-
67 238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W.2d 191 (1964), overruled on other grounds, Stimson
Tractor Co. v. Heffin, 257 Ark. 263, S16 S.W.2d 379 ('974). See also note 77 infra.
6B4o0 F. 2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968).
69 Id. at 118.
Thus the buyer bore the burden of proving that the horse was not defective.
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cation.- The requirement of notification has been imposed
straightforwardly to preclude rejection and revocation where the
buyer fails to notify 'the seller or where the alleged notice is so
imprecise that a reasonable person would not construe it as an
attempt to rescind.7" Such a literal application of the requirement
is usually consistent with efficiency both because the seller may
incur expenses in reliance on the buyer's acceptance and because
the lack or vagueness of notification may indicate the buyer's
belief that there has been no breach.
A better test of the present hypothesis, however, is not whether
the courts apply the notification requirement literally, but
whether they apply it in a manner inconsistent with its literal
terms but consistent with minimization of costs. In several cases
in which rescission appeared to be the more efficient remedy,
courts have found sufficient notification despite the fact that
there had been no communication between the buyer and seller
which could reasonably be construed as such. In two cases, the
notification requirement was found to be satisfied by the buyer's
filing suit and refusing to allow the seller to cure; 71 in another,
by vague complaints and a refusal to continue payments.72 Fi-
nally, in one case in which the court felt obliged to deny rejec-
tion because of lack of notification, it nevertheless awarded the
buyer the purchase price as damages and gave the seller the right
to reclaim the goods.73 This unusual remedy is rejection in sub-
stance but not in form. It is likely to minimize costs, since the
goods at issue - equipment designed for the buyer's business-
proved useless in their intended application.
4. Rejection: Acts Inconsistent with the Seller's Ownership.
-- The provision for construing acceptance from an act of the
buyer inconsistent with the seller's ownership has been invoked
in ways that minimize costs where the buyer's actions with re-
spect to the goods - for example, his continued use of or payment
for the goods after rejection - indicate that the goods conform
to his purposes.74 A second cost-minimizing function for the pro-
vision is to preclude rejection where some action of the buyer
indicates that the remedy of damages is less costly than that of
"0 See, e.g., Phil Jacobs Co. v. Mifflin, 23 Ill. App. 3d 999, ioo--02, 320
N.E.2d 329, 331 (1974) (per curiam); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273
Md. I, I8, 327 A.2d 502, 514 (1974).
1 Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., x6 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349
(1976); Fenton v. Contemporary Dev. Co., 12 Wash. App. 315, 529 P.2d 883
(1974).
7 2 Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 28o N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d i61 (1972).73 Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I. Klayman & Co., 379 F. Supp. x3o6 (E.D. Pa. 1974).71 See, e.g., Ingle v. Marked Tree Equip. Co., 244 Ark. ii66, 428 S.W.2d 286
(1968).
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rejection. In Bowen v. Young,70 for example, the buyer had
ordered a mobile home in Texas to be delivered in South Caro-
lina. Upon receipt, the buyer noticed various defects and im-
mediately complained to both the seller and the manufacturer,
neither of whom made any attempt to repair the defects. Later
the buyer wired the seller to cancel the sale. But, failing to re-
ceive any response, the buyer moved into the mobile home, in-
vested $6oo in repair and adaptation, and lived in it for over
a year. He then had the home moved back to Texas, where he
later brought suit seeking rejection. The court of appeals denied
rejection but remanded the case for proof of damages, holding
that the buyer's dominion over the home subsequent to his ad-
mittedly rightful rejection was an "act inconsistent." 11 The cen-
tral issue in the case was not whether the contract had been
breached but whether rejection or damages was the appropriate
remedy. The buyer's actions - living in the home and investing
significant amounts accommodating it to his purposes - indicated
a probability that he placed a value on the home higher than
the resale value to the seller. To award the buyer rejection and
to force a resale would reduce the joint value of the contract.77
Although a buyer's continued possession of goods strongly
suggests that he finds them useful, in some situations a buyer's
continued use diminishes total costs. It supports the hypothesis
of this Article that in such situations courts have permitted re-
jection. For example, in Garfinkel v. Lehman Floor Covering
Co.,78 the buyer complained upon installation of the unsightly
appearance of a carpet. Although the seller attempted to cor-
rect the condition, the buyer remained unsatisfied. Confronted
with a finding that the carpet was defective, the seller argued
that rejection should be denied because of the buyer's continued
use of the carpet. The court, however, granted rejection, em-
is 507 S.W.2d 6oo (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
76 Id. at 603-o5.
" In a similar case, Woods v. Van Wallis Trailer Sales Co., 77 N.M. 12 , 419
P.2d 964 (x966), a New Mexico court found that a mobile home failed to con-
form to the contract, but denied rejection because of the buyer's inconsistent
acts-moving into the trailer and installing gas lines and a washing machine. See
also F.W. Lang Co. v. Fleet, 193 Pa. Super Ct. 365, 165 A.2d 258 (x96o).
There has been confusion over the availability of damages once rejection has
been denied because of the buyer's inconsistent action. In Hudspeth Motors, Inc.
v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W.2d 191 (1964), overruled, Stimson Tractor Co.
v. Heflin, 257 Ark. 263, 516 S.W.2d 379 (1974), for example, damages were
denied along with rejection, although this ruling was overturned a decade later
in Stimson. It is significant that the denial of damages in Hudspeth was con-
sistent with cost minimization in that case, although the legal rule that the court
subsequently derived from the case is not. See p. 988 supra.
" 6o Misc. 2d 72, 302 N.Y.S.2d i67 (Dist. Ct. 1969).
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phasizing that it would have been costly for the buyer to have
removed, transported, and stored the defective carpet.
This case illustrates how judicial interpretation can minimize
the costs of sales because it is a clear example of a dispute re-
quiring the application of conflicting Code provisions. Section
2-602(2) provides that a rejecting buyer must make the goods
available to the seller, though he "has no further obligations"
with regard to them. Yet under the "act inconsistent" provision,
a buyer has an obligation not to exercise dominion over the
goods or make use of them. In Garfinkel the seller had not re-
claimed the goods, but neither had the buyer held them aside for
the seller's disposition. Instead, he had continued to use them,
thus violating a literal interpretation of the "act inconsistent"
provision as well as the principle discussed earlier under which
continued use had been held -to preclude rejection.7" Neverthe-
less, the court granted rejection on a theory which seems to
minimize costs.
Acts found not inconsistent with the seller's ownership in
similar cases include extended experimentation with a computer,
because of the complexity of the machine and its intended use; 1o
use and attempted repair of an automobile, because of ignorance
of the defects and continuous attempts to work out differences
with the seller; 81 continued storage of large quantities of grain
in a defective silo, because of the high cost of removing the re-
maining grain; 82 and continued use of defective car-washing
equipment until substitute equipment was available, because
the continued use served to mitigate damages.8 3
5. Revocation: Substantial Change in the Condition of the
79 See p. 989 & note 74 supra.
For a case similar to Garfinkel, see Askco Eng'r Corp. v. Mobil Chem. Corp.,
535 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (buyer's removal and burial of useless goods,
after unsuccessful attempt to process part of shipment, held not to be an act
inconsistent with seller's ownership).
Although Llewellyn had argued for exceptions to the enforcement of the "act
inconsistent" provision, he never referred to such actions as those in Garfinkel
and Askco Engineering. See Quality II, supra note i6, at 390-92 & n.129. He
might have excused Mobil's use of the goods in processing but made no mention
of destruction of remaining material as excusable.
10 Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa.
1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1400 (3 d Cir. '974).
8 Lloyd v. Classic Motor Coaches, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 785, 790 n.i (N.D. Ohio
1974) (rejection served to "minimize losses resulting from defective performance").
" The court was conscious that there was no apparent gain to either party
from emptying the silo. Maas v. Scoboda, i88 Neb. i89, i95 N.W.2d 491 (1972).
8 Valley Die Cast Corp. v. A.D.W., Inc., 25 Mich. App. 321, 181 N.W.2d 303
(1970). See also Jones v. Abriani, 35o N.E.2d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (actually
a revocation case, although the court decided the rejection issue); Clark v.
Zaid, Inc., 263 Md. 127, 282 A.2d 483 (1971).
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Goods and the Doctrine of the Buyer's Waiver. - The provision
prohibiting revocation of acceptance after a "substantial change
in condition of the goods not caused by their own defects" might
be invoked where a change that the buyer has made in the goods
indicates either that the contract was not breached or that dam-
ages are the cheaper remedy -that is, as an analogue to the
"act inconsistent" provision for rejection. Because the provision
focuses on changes in the goods rather than the behavior of the
buyer, however, this interpretation has been employed only in-
frequently. Instead, courts have created a novel doctrine of the
buyer's "waiver" of the right to revoke, as well as other remedies
unknown to the Code.
An illustration of this sort of judicial innovation is a Wash-
ington State case, Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey. 4 The buy-
er there had ordered toys for the -Christmas trade, and, after
the seller's first shipments contained fewer stuffed animals than
he wanted, the buyer cancelled further deliveries. At the time
of cancellation, however, a further shipment was in transit, and
although the seller authorized the buyer to return the toys, the
buyer kept them and sold some of them. He attempted to revoke
acceptance of the remainder after the Christmas season had
passed. Though the decision denying revocation is straightfor-
ward - the buyer's retention and attempt to sell the goods can
be construed with little dispute as an acceptance of the risk of
resale - the difficulty of justifying such an outcome by the
"substantial change in condition of the goods" provision is ap-
parent. The market value of the goods may have declined be-
cause the Christmas season had passed, but the condition of the
goods had not changed between tender and revocation. In deny-
ing revocation the court announced as an independent ground
for the decision that the buyer's actions were inconsistent with
revocation,"5 but no such limit on the right to revoke is present
in the Code.
Courts have denied revocation but awarded damages despite
extensive and continued use of the defective goods by the buyer
after revocation. In Underwood v. Monte Asti Buick Co., 0 for
example, the buyer revoked immediately after discovery of the
defect but two years after purchase. After notification, the buyer
continued to use the car, and at the time of trial she had driven
it over 50,000 miles. The court denied revocation but awarded
damages because the car was undeniably defective.
84 78 Wash. 2d 343, 474 P.2d 270 (,970) (en banc).
" Id. at 349, 474 P.2d at 273. However, the court found lack of substantial
impairment and unreasonable delay in giving notice as alternative grounds for the
decision. Id. at 348-49, 474 P.2d at 273.
88 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 773, 782 (1976).
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In Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corp.,"7
the Colorado Court of Appeals interpreted the remedial pro-
visions of the Code to achieve efficiency in a manner even more
striking. The court held that the buyer's continued occupancy of
a defective mobile home for a year and a half after revoking
acceptance was wrongful against the seller, but because the mo-
bile home was substantially defective, awarded revocation and
simultaneously awarded damages to the seller equal to the value
of the buyer's use of the goods.8 This remedy cannot be rec-
onciled with any plausible interpretation of the Code's revoca-
tion provisions. Rather, it likely serves to minimize the dis-
tributional loss to the seller arising from the buyer's revocation.
One might consider the waiver cases to be unworthy of notice,
since the buyer's continued use of an allegedly defective product
after announcing revocation seems sufficiently inconsistent with
his legal claim as to make the denial of revocation automatic.
There is evidence, however, that courts have employed the waiv-
er doctrine not in response to the contradiction between the buy-
er's revocation and his continued usage but in response to costs.
In Jones v. Abriani 89 and Minsel v. El Rancho Mobile Home
Center, Inc.,"0 for example, the courts found that the buyer's con-
tinued use did not preclude revocation because it might serve
to mitigate consequential damages for which the seller was re-
sponsible. In Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Machine & Foundry
Co.,' the court found that because the seller was the only do-
mestic manufacturer of the machine purchased, the buyer was
forced to continue use to minimize consequential damages. In
Jorgensen v. Pressnall,9 u the court held that the buyer's con-
tinued use was permissible as protection of his security interest
in the goods but awarded the seller an offset for the buyer's use.
These decisions illustrate that the common law doctrine of waiv-
er in revocation cases is not slavishly tied to continued and in-
consistent usage of defective goods, but is responsive to the rela-
tive costs of alternatives available to the buyer.
There is a final set of cases in which courts have invoked the
waiver doctrine to deny revocation because of the buyer's usage
of the goods prior to discovery of the defect. These cases show
that courts are sensitive to distributional losses imposed on a sel-
ler when the buyer can revoke acceptance and recover the con-
87 530 P.2d 989 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
"I Id. at 993-94.
8935o N.E.2d 635, 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (dictum).
9o 32 Mich. App. io, I5, 188 N.W.2d 9, 12 (1971).
91 125 NJ. Super. 251, 258, 31o A.2d 491, 494-95 (App. Div.), pet. denied,
64 N.J. 317, 315 A.2d 405 (1973).
92 274 Or. 285, 292, 545 P.2d 1392, 1385--86 (1976) (en banc).
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tract price after the goods have depreciated substantially. 3 In
one case, a court awarded the buyer damages for the defect in
the same action in which it denied revocation. 4 Indeed, although
the Code does not empower such a remedy, courts in eight juris-
dictions have awarded sellers damages for buyers' use? 5
6. Revocation: Substantial Impairment and the Subjective
Standard of Valuation. - Although the "substantial impairment"
requirement is frequently invoked, the only important function
it has served is to allow judges to deny revocation where the
defect in the goods seems trivial. While such a function is con-
sistent with cost minimization, it is also consistent with a literal
interpretation of the provision. Part III, however, showed that
a literal interpretation of the modifying phrase "to him" giving
special acknowledgment to the subjective values of buyers - in
particular, of consumer buyers - would be inefficient .There-
fore the cost minimization hypothesis suggests that courts will
interpret the phrase "to him" without deference to subjective
losses to the buyer.
Case law strikingly confirms this prediction. The subjective
standard of section 2-608 has been the basis for an award of
revocation in only two of thirty-eight decisions involving the
materiality of the defect 6 Moreover, even in the single case in
which the court's interpretation of the standard was unambigu-
ously subjective, the extent to which the court was willing to dis-
regard efficiency was limited. The court stated that the efficiency
of the remedy alone was not determinative, but it awarded the
seller damages equal to the value of the buyer's use of the goods
93 See, e.g., Cooper v. Mason, 14 N.C. App. 472, 474, 188 S.E.2d 653, 655 (2972);
Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d x, 15-16, 321 N.E.2d 897, 906-07 (974);
Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W. Va. 453, 46o-6I, 184 S.E.2d 722, 726
(971). But see Dopieralla v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 255 Ark. 150, 152, 499 S.W.2d
6Io, 611 (1973).
" Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d i, 25-I6, 321 N.E.2d 897, 906-07
(1974).
" See Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corp., 530 P.2d at 994;
Orange Motors v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 3X9, 321 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 832 (2972); American Container Corp. v.
Hanley Trucking Corp., ii N.J. Super. 322, 334-35, 268 A.2d 313, 320 (Ch. Div.
1970); Gawlick v. American Builders Supply, Inc., 86 N.M. 77, 79, 519 P.2d 313,
315 (Ct. App. 1974); White Devon Farm v. Stahl, 88 Misc. 2d 96, 967-68, 389
N.Y.S.2d 724, 729 (Sup. Ct. 2976) (trustee theory); Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or.
at 292, 545 P.2d at 2386; Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d
227, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2972); Explorers Motor Home Corp. v. Aldridge, 542
S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
" See Barrington Homes, Inc. v. Kelley, 320 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (interpretation of subjective standard ambiguous) ; Jorgensen v. Press-
nail, 274 Or. 285, 289-91, 545 P.2d 1382, 1384-85 (2976) (en banc).
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prior to revocationY In six other cases, the "subjective" stand-
ard has appeared to be the grounds for the decision, but in
none were the particular values of the buyers determinative."
In fact, in two deoisions courts explicitly rejected the interpre-
tation suggested by Comment 2 in favor of an objective stand-
ard, more consistent with cost minimization."
7. The Substantive Grounds for Rejection and Revocation of
Acceptance. - This subsection examines the hypothesis of con-
sistency of case law with cost minimization in a new way: it ig-
nores the particular legal issue in the case and compares the ju-
dicial resolution of the disputes to the efficient resolution as de-
termined from facts reported in the opinion.
Grants of rejection should be much less frequent than the
broad language of section 2-6oi might imply since the conditions
under which rejection will minimize costs are quite limited. Of
the sixty-two appellate rejection decisions announced between
1954 and 1976, rejection has been affirmed in only seventeen
cases, equal to twenty-seven percent.' This aggregate figure,
of course, confirms the prediction in only a general way, for it
conceals the presence or absence of the particular cost-minimiz-
ing conditions in individual cases. One refinement is to distin-
guish suits brought under section 2-6ox by consumers from those
brought by merchants. As discussed earlier, the cost minimization
hypothesis implies that rejection should be awarded more fre-
quently where the buyer is a consumer.'0 ' Again, the findings
are confirming. Rejection was awarded in eight of eighteen suits
brought by consumer buyers (forty-four percent), but in only
nine of forty-four suits brought by merchant buyers (twenty
percent).
A second way of testing the hypothesis is to examine at-
-tempts to reject goods specially designed for the buyer. Since
97 Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or. 285, 289-91, 545 P.2d 1382, 1384-85 (1976)
(en banc).
"
8 Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 292, 224 So. 2d 638, 646
(x969); Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corp., 530 P.2d 989, 992-
93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 Ill. App. 3d 530,
535-36, 358 N.E.2d 382, 386 (1976) ; Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill.
App. 3d 348, 359-60, 292 N.E.2d 168, 176-77 (,972); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc.
v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 458, 24o A.2d 195, 204-05 (Law Div. 1968); Shofner
v. Williams & Pearson Furniture Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep. 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970)
(by inference).
" See Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. i, 9, 342 A.2d 181,
185 (I975); Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 78 Wash. 2d 342, 348, 474 P.2d
270, 273 (1970) (en banc). See also Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492 S.W.
2d 227, 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
100 Citations are on file at the Harvard Law Review and are available from the
author. See note 44 supra.
101 See p. 979 supra.
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custom-made goods, even if defective in some respect, are likely
to be more valuable to the buyer than to anyone else, damages
are probably the cheaper remedy in cases involving such goods.
Five rejection cases have been decided in which the goods were
specially designed for the buyer, and rejection was denied in all
but one. In Beco, Inc. v. Minnechaug Golf Course, Inc.,0 2 a
typical example, the seller had begun setting the first portion of
specially designed restaurant equipment in position when the
buyer refused to allow any further work. The seller voluntarily
agreed to make alterations, but before they were completed the
buyer rejected all of the equipment as nonconforming. The is-
sue in the case was not whether the contract had been breached,
but whether rejection was the appropriate remedy. Although
there are no statutory grounds for such a holding, the court de-
nied rejection but awarded the buyer damages for certain non-
conformities. 1°3 The decisions in three other cases denying re-
jection are similar." 4 Although a court awarded rejection in one
case involving custom-made goods, rejection was awarded only
because extensive efforts to repair the goods by the seller had
been unsuccessful. 1 5
A final method of testing the cost minimization hypothesis
for rejection cases is to look individually at the seventeen cases
in which rejection was awarded. The hypothesis implies that in
each, either the costs of reselling the defective goods will be
higher to the buyer than to the seller or the costs of calculat-
ing the buyer's damages will be high. We have already mentioned
that the eight cases in which rejection was awarded to consumer
buyers are generally consistent with the prediction. A closer
look at these cases provides additional support. Five of the cases
involved the purchase of a new automobile from a dealer. In
general, it is plausible that a dealer will be able to resell a de-
fective automobile more cheaply than the initial purchaser. These
particular decisions, however, are notable for the court's em-
phasis in each on the relevance of the nature of the defect to
the award of rejection. Each of the five cases involved defects
of a very complex nature: the fusing of a differential to an axle,100
transmission failure,10 7 emission of smoke and fumes,'08 or mul-
1025 Conn. Cir. Ct. 444, 256 A.2d 522 (1968). Other citations are on file at
the Harvard Law Review and are available from the author. See note 44 supra.
103 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. at 446-51, 256 A.2d at 524-26.
104 See R.R. Waites Co. v. E.H. Thrift Air Cond., Inc., 5zo S.W.2d 759 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1974); Stephens Indus. v. American Express Co., 47X S.W.2d 5ox (Mo.
Ct. App. 1971); Sal Metal Products Co. v. Rennert, S U.C.C. Rep. 826 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1968).
105 See Hayes v. Hettinga, 228 N.W.2d i8i (Iowa 1975).
106 Bayne v. Nall Motors, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1137 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1973).
10 7 Menard & Holmberg Rambler, Inc. v. Shea, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 167 (Mass. App.
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tiple defects costing several thousand dollars to repair. 09 . Two
opinions draw attention to the difficulty to the consumer buyer
of discovering the full extent of the defects, because of the like-
lihood that other parts of the auto had been affected. 10 This
difficulty, of course, increases both the cost of calculating the
buyer's damages and the cost to the buyer of reselling the goods,
especially relative to the cost of resale to an expert in automobile
repair."' In cases of this nature, rejection is likely to be the
cost-minimizing remedy.
Eight of the nine cases in which rejection was awarded to
merchant buyers are equally consistent with the hypothesis. The
best example is Carl Beasley Ford v. Burroughs Corp.," 2 in which
an automobile dealer purchased an electronic accounting system.
The system was never accurate, and the seller was never able
to correct the defects; so rejection appears to have been a cheaper
remedy than damages. Resale by one of the parties was inevit-
able, and the manufacturer was more likely than the buyer to
know about potential customers and alternative uses. Other cases
are similar in that the court awarded rejection after evidence was
presented showing that the defective goods were substantially
valueless.'" Where goods are valueless, there is no resale ad-
vantage between the two parties. Therefore, rejection is the
cheaper remedy since the court can avoid calculating the buyer's
loss.
Part III predicted that a greater proportion of revocation
cases than rejection cases would consist of suits brought by con-
sumers rather than merchants, and that the proportion of rev-
ocation awards would be greater than the proportion of rejection
awards." 4 The case law is generally confirming. The proportion
of consumer revocation suits (56%) is substantially greater than
the proportion of consumer rejection suits (29%). In addition,
the proportion of suits awarding revocation (55%) is greater
than the -proportion of suits awarding rejection (27%). This
second finding is especially significant, since the Code, as we
X97o); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 44i, 240 A.2d i95
(Law Div. 1968).
108 Havas v. Love, 89 Nev. 458, 514 P.2d 1187 (1973) (per curiam).
1o Lloyd v. Classic Motor Coaches, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
110 See id. at 790; Bayne v. Nall Motors, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1137, ii4o (Iowa
Dist. Ct. '973).
... But see p. 973 & note 31 supra.
112361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d i4oo (3d Cir. 1974).
1' See, e.g., La Villa Fair v. Lewis Carpet MiUs, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 407, 548
P.2d 825, 835 (1976) (goods were "inferior, substandard, nonconforming and wholly
undesirable merchandise"); Askco Eng'r Corp. v. Mobil Chem. Corp., 535 S.W.2d
893 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
" See p. 979 supra.
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know, has incorporated more stringent requirements for the
award of revocation than for rejection."' The best explanation
for this finding seems to be the sensitivity of courts to the costs
of sales transactions." 6
While the above analysis attributes the greater success in rev-
ocation suits solely to the greater proportion of suits by con-
sumers, in fact the rate of success both for consumers and mer-
chants is greater in revocation than in rejection cases. If, how-
ever, cases in which the seller chose not to cure the defect - mak-
ing revocation automatic -are segregated from the revocation
cases, the difference between the recovery rates in revocation and
rejection suits becomes less marked. Consumers were awarded rev-
ocation in 39% of the remaining revocation cases in comparison
to 44% of rejection cases, and merchants in 38% of the remain-
ing revocation cases in comparison to 20% of rejection cases.
As predicted, the proportion of suits brought by consumers re-
mains higher for revocation than rejection (45% compared to
29%) and the proportion of recoveries is higher for revocation
than rejection (40% compared to 27%). The substantial dif-
ference between the rates of success in cases brought by mer-
chants, however, remains unexplained.
Another method of testing the hypothesis that courts will
minimize costs in revocation cases is to look at those cases in-
volving goods specially designed for the buyer. The results are
consistent with the hypothesis but not as strongly as for the
rejection cases. Of ten decisions involving specially designed
11White and Summers have predicted that the differential rate of success
in rejection suits may be only slightly higher, see J. WHiT & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 35, at 255, 257, but to the author's knowledge there have been no previous
intimations that the rate of revocation awards would be greater.
"'An alternative explanation for the fact that consumers bring more revo-
cation than rejection actions is that consumers, unlike merchants, normally do
not inspect goods before acceptance, but take the goods home for use, where
they later discover the nonconformity. Moreover, the concept of rejection has
little meaning for consumers because contracts for sale of consumer goods are sel-
dom made much in advance of delivery.
The different success rate in revocation cases can be explained on grounds of
the seller's incentive to litigate. Where the buyer is a consumer, accepted goods
are used goods, which are difficult to resell. Where the buyer is a merchant,
revocation is likely to entail consequential damages such as loss of trade or pro-
duction. In either case, a seller is likely to have a greater incentive to litigate a
case than in a rejection action, in which goods are likely to have depreciated
less and consequential damages are likely to be smaller. This alone explains only
the greater volume of revocation actions. However, because the risk of consequen-
tial damages is more substantial in relation to litigation costs than the risk of depre-
ciation of consumer goods, the seller to a merchant buyer will have greater incen-
tive to invest legal resources in the hope of avoiding or reducing a damage award.
This may explain why the success rate for revocation actions is even higher for
consumer buyers (64%) than for merchants (43%).
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goods, revocation was denied in four 117 and awarded in three." 8
Although the three cases in which revocation was awarded may
seem inconsistent with the hypothesis, in two the goods appeared
to have little value to the buyer," 9 and in the third the buyer
had disposed of the goods by the time of trial; so the issue of
revocation arose only in connection with the measure of dam-
ages.' 2
0
B. Cure of Defective Tender
Part III showed that the provisions of the Code make it very
difficult for courts to devise rules to achieve efficiency where the
nonconformity in the goods can be cured. Where the price of
the goods or the buyer's information has changed, courts must
either permit overinvestment in cure or grant a windfall to the
buyer. This dilemma has led to contradictory decisions and to
interpretations that are less coherent among the various juris-
dictions than interpretations of the Code's rejection and revo-
cation provisions.
Judicial decisions have had some effect in promoting effi-
ciency where the buyer attempts to refuse the seller's cure. The
text of the Code, of course, makes no reference to the buyer's
right to refuse cure, although it does require that cure be "sea-
sonable." Courts, however, have allowed buyers to reject or
revoke acceptance, despite the seller's willingness to continue
repair, in situations in which it is plausible that the cost of the
seller's investment outweighs the benefits conferred upon the
buyer. In Melby v. Hawkins Pontiac, Inc.,"1' for example, the
"'7 See United States ex. rel. Fram Corp. v. Crawford, 453 F.2d 61i (5th Cir.
197i); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 14-18, 327 A.2d 502, 512-14
(1974); Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 479-8I, 269 N.E.2d
664, 667-68 (i97i); Desilets Granite Co. v. Stone Equalizer Corp., 133 Vt. 372,
374-75, 34o A.2d 65, 67 (1975).
"'TTwo were remanded for further proof. See Lenkay Sani Prods. Corp. v.
Benitez, 47 A.D.2d 524, 525, 362 N.Y.S.2d 572, 573-74 (i975); Fablok Mills, Inc.
v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 125 N.J. Super. 251, 256-57, 31o A.2d 491, 494
(App. Div.), pet. denied, 64 N.J. 317, 35 A.2d 405 (I973).
In the final case, the court apparently denied rejection and did not reach the
issue of revocation but nevertheless awarded revocation in effect by granting the
buyer damages equal to the full purchase price and allowing the seller to reclaim
the goods. Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I. Klayman & Co., 379 F. Supp. 13o6 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
"' Four Sons Bakery, Inc. v. Dulman, 542 F.2d 829, 831-32 (ioth Cir. 1976);
Regents of the Univ. of Colo. v. Pacific Pump & Supply, Inc., 528 P.2d 941, 943
(Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
"°Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 99, 192
N.W.2d 58o, 585 (ig7i).
121 13 Wash. App. 745, 746, 537 P.2d 807, 809 (1975). See also Tiger Motors
v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So.2d 638 (1969).
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court allowed the buyer to revoke his acceptance after the auto-
mobile he purchased had been in the seller's shop for repair for i91
of 197 days since purchase.
Courts have not permitted the buyer to refuse cure, how-
ever, where the costs to the seller of effecting cure and the costs
to the buyer of waiting for the goods to be cured are low. In
Wilson v. Scampoli,122 for example, the buyer was denied re-
scission because she had refused to allow the seller to remove a
defective television to the seller's shop for repair. The court's
consideration of costs was explicit: it found that the defect could
be cured in a short period of time at a cost of "no great incon-
venience" to the buyer. 2 In other decisions courts have pro-
hibited the buyer from refusing the seller's cure in situations
where it is plausible that the buyer's refusal to allow cure was
motivated by a change in the market price or in his information
about the goods. 24
V. CONCLUSION
The issues raised in the cases surveyed in the previous Part
are narrow and have limited implications for the course of com-
merce. But more significant than the specific resolutions of the
disputes themselves is the method that underlies the resolutions.
During the first two decades of Code enforcement, courts have
122 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. z967).
.23 See id. at 85o. Schwartz, however, criticizes this decision. See Schwartz,
supra note 2, at 553-54.
Similarly, in Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W. Va. 453, 456, 184 S.E.2d
722, 724 (I971), the buyer was denied revocation where the cost of repairing a non-
conforming automobile was estimated at $35 to $8o, seemingly much less than the
cost of reselling the defective car.
124 See, e.g., Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455, 459-61 (M.D. Pa. 1972);
Beco, Inc. v. Minnechaug Golf Course, Inc., 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 444, 256 A.2d 522
(1968).
Cases arising under the Code's installment contract provision are few in num-
ber, but their results are also generally consistent with the hypothesis here. Com-
pare Graulich Caterer, Inc. v. Hans Holterbosch, Inc., ioi N.J. Super. 61, 76-77,
243 A.2d 253, 262 (App. Div. 1968) (nonconformity in second installment of Ger-
man food for World's Fair concession substantially impaired value of whole con-
tract where buyer needed to establish an immediate source of food for the fair),
with Holiday Mfg. Co. v. BA.S.F. Sys. Inc., 38o F. Supp. Io96, 1102-04 (D. Neb.
1974) (serious nonconformities over a substantial period of time do not constitute
breach where buyer understood that seller was manufacturing by a new process,
seller's efforts to cure had been reasonably successful and timely, and delay was
not as costly to buyer as in Graulich). See also Laredo Hides Co. v. H & H Meat
Prods. Co., 513 S.W.2d 210, 214-6 (Tex. Ct. App. x974) (buyer held not to have
breached by failure to tender payment within deadline unilaterally imposed by
seller, where evidence indicated rising market encouraged seller's anticipatory
breach).
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developed coherent interpretations consistent with a model of
remedies that minimizes costs.
Support for this proposition is widespread and can be found
in the interpretation of virtually every provision of the Code
regarding the seller's tender. Moreover, decisions consistent with
minimization of costs have not been limited to the literal scope
of the Code's provisions. Where necessary, courts have extended
Code principles beyond the letter of the Code in ways which
minimize costs. Where no appropriate Code principles existed,
courts have themselves created doctrines which reduce costs,
such as the buyer's waiver of the right of revocation and the
award of damages for the buyer's use. In certain cases, courts
have refused to adopt interpretations of the Code, such as the
subjective valuation standard for revocation of acceptance, which
increase the costs of sales transactions.
Certainly the criterion of economic efficiency is nowhere ex-
pressed as a basis of the Code in law or policy. Yet the narrow
legal doctrines embodied in the Code's provisions are often re-
sponsive to an underlying concern for efficiency and are usually
applied so as to minimize the costs of sales. Analysis of the costs
of a given transaction thus may permit parties to predict the out-
come of a judicial decision. And whenever case law diverges
from the literal interpretation of the text of a statute, some
method of prediction becomes essential.
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